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As Judith Norman states it quite clearly in the preface to her translation of (the 
second draft of) Schelling’s Weltalter fragments, it will “undoubtedly strike 
the reader” that the methodological intent of the work is to interpret things “in 
terms of man”. She refers to the bulk of these cases as “Schelling’s conscious 
anthropomorphisms” (Norman 1997: 112). And indeed, Schelling himself does 
not hide that he is taking the human being to represent a kind of “microcosm” 
that expresses the general structure of the universe. A “system of times” will un-
fold, as he writes, “of which the human system would be just a copy, a repetition 
within a narrower space” (Schelling 1997: 121). Sometimes, his adherence to this 
principle is even quite casually stated, as when he says that “according to Hip-
pocrates [everything divine is human], and everything human is divine”, and 
if this is the case, “we can hope to approach the truth by relating everything to 
man” (Ibid.: 157). At other times, the familiar realm of human existence is offered 
like an excellent, and almost as if unexpected, solution to a great conundrum: 
How can we grasp the will that wills nothing, a nature that does not know itself?
Think! – have you ever enjoyed those rare moments of such blissful and perfect 
fulfillment, when the heart desires nothing, when you could wish these moments 
to remain eternally as they are, and when they actually are like an eternity to 
you? Think of this and try to remember how, in just such moments, a will is al-
ready at work producing itself, although unbeknownst to you and without your 
effort – indeed, you could not prevent this production. This will soon pulls you 
back to yourself; it tears you away, back into the activities of life. Remember this, 
and you will have an approximate picture of what we are presently undertaking 
to describe (Ibid.: 136).
We are looking for a way to handle the structure of God’s becoming God, and 
almost coincidentally, it seems, we stumble upon the human being that miracu-
lously fits the purpose perfectly. Making the case of anthropomorphism against 
Schelling could therefore seem like running in open doors. There are striking 
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similarities between the structure of God, inorganic life, organic life, and hu-
man life, and sometimes Schelling simply cites a familiar example from human 
life as if it was an argument for the structure of God and the world in and of 
itself. If by “anthropomorphism”, however, is meant a projection of well known 
human qualities onto other forms of being, (like in some so called primitive re-
ligious mythology), then I would none the less maintain that the case is not so 
clear, and the main thrust of this paper will be to make a plausible case for an-
other interpretation. A more precise term to describe the endeavour in Weltalter, 
I think, would be ontological isomorphism. The book is an attempt at thinking 
the structure of being as such, with the human being as one case among others, 
but the approach is not to project certain well known features onto for instance 
God (like in, say, “God also has a temper”), but much more to show how basic 
ontological features of the world can be found in human life in ways we might 
not have expected. Indeed, the entire enterprise of Weltalter in many ways is to 
uncover a knowledge that does not know itself, as it is almost literally called 
(Ibid.: 114-115), and thus a structure that is as foreign to the human being itself 
as to anything, it might “project it” onto. In other words: If anthropocentrism 
projects the well known unto the unknown, Schelling’s approach is the oppo-
site. He projects the unknown onto (what we thought was) the well known. It is 
this priority of the unknown that makes Weltalter such a painful experience to 
read (as Žižek has rightly pointed out (Žižek 1997: 4)), since its challenge of the 
well known does not end up in a kind of hermeneutic sublation, where we reach 
a new kind of understanding after a little bit of Verfremdung. The unknown re-
mains in the heart of the well known as something unrecognizable in a quite 
literal sense that we shall return to.
What Schelling does do, undoubtedly, is that he blatantly violates the Kantian 
prohibition against stipulating anything of the Thing-in-itself. If any concept 
would be worthy of this Kantian name, it would certainly be the “schlechthin 
Erste” that is God’s absolute indifference before creation. If you think that Kant 
represented a kind of “unvordenkliches” of modern philosophy, it is very dif-
ficult to read Weltalter without at least sometimes thinking that this amounts 
to some form of esoteric, pre-critical metaphysics. Nonetheless, this story as 
well can be told in another way. As Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek have showed 
at great length, one of the crucial features of both Hegel’s and Schelling’s phi-
losophy is that they insisted on thinking contradiction in a way that moved it 
from being an epistemological problem to the problem of ontology. In Science 
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of Logic, for instance, Hegel praises Kant for elevating dialectics to a level that 
no one before him had granted it, and for having established contradiction as a 
necessary determination of thought, while the presentation of dialectics in the 
antinomies of reason, however, “deserve little praise” (Hegel 1999a: 40). And in 
Weltalter, Schelling has a similar point: “… contradiction is not only possible 
but in fact necessary”, and not only as the endpoint of dialectical logics in the 
Kantian sense, but much more as a starting point: 
Although men – in both living and knowing – seem to shy away from nothing so 
much as contradiction, they still must confront it, because life itself is in contra-
diction (Schelling 1997: 124).
Kant did “confront contradiction” in his antinomies, but it would also be fair 
to say that he shied away from it again in their resolution, when he denied any 
further access to things-in-themselves and concluded that reason must proceed 
as if there were no contradiction, out of “Zärtlichkeit für die weltlichen Dinge”, 
as Hegel ironically said (Hegel 1999b: 84)1. In other words: Kant’s concern for 
things was so great that he wouldn’t impose contradiction on them and there-
fore let it apply only to reason itself, as its own ultimate horizon from within. 
Contradiction remains an inevitable outcome of a speculative reason that seeks 
the limit of its own capacities (does the world have a beginning in time, or has 
it always been – we will never be able to figure that out), but whether or not 
things-in-themselves could also be in contradiction lies outside the scope of hu-
man reason to establish. Contradiction remains on “our side” of the divide. The 
transcendental ideas, accordingly, can never have a constitutive use, but they 
nonetheless have an eminent and indispensable regulative use by providing a 
focal point (“focus imaginarius”) to guide the use of the understanding, such 
that it avoids confronting contradiction in its normal proceedings. We must pro-
ceed as if the world was a meaningful and coherent whole, and as if each of our 
experiences makes sense within this whole. Without the regulative use of the 
transcendental ideas, we would, strictly speaking, become insane, for we would 
oscillate between contradictory definite answers to the questions of how things 
really are (see Kant 1974: B 672). The normal-neurotic workings of the under-
1 I owe thanks to Søren Mads Mau for making me aware of this precise and quite wonderful 
formulation.
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standing in its Kantian outlook could thus be described with a paraphrase of the 
well known prohibition from Fawlty Towers: “Don’t mention the contradiction!”
Faktum der Vernunft
There is thus an element of fetishist disavowal in the Kantian solution of the 
antinomies of reason: We know very well that we have reached a point of the 
highest interest to reason – one which may or may not relate to fundamental 
characteristics of the thing itself – but nonetheless we proceed as if this problem 
has been overcome.
Schelling draws the opposite consequence: There is something in reason, which 
contradicts reason itself – reason thus already contains something other than 
itself, or at least itself as its own other. The other of reason is not something “out 
there”, neither in the form of the so called “great outside”, which reason may or 
may not be able to depicture or represent, nor is it the “in itself” on the other 
side of reason, which could be termed the absolute; it is something “in here”, 
which is inherent to reason’s own most fundamental characteristics. Kant did 
identify this inherent otherness of reason to itself, but instead of pursuing it, he 
found ways to cover it up, if you will. (It pops up, almost in a ghostly fashion, 
when he refers to “depths of the human soul that we may never apprehend” 
(Ibid.: B 181-182) and of course to the “I or He or It, the Thing, which Thinks” in 
the paralogisms (Ibid.: B 404)).
We could call this Schelling’s version of the “Faktum der Vernunft”: The fact is 
that reason itself contains something other; something more real (almost real in 
the Lacanian sense) than its regulative or practical use. You can pretend that it 
isn’t there, but the fact remains. Kant’s original “Faktum of Vernunft” was the 
undeniable awareness of the moral law, which every human being possesses. 
The “fact” of reason is something that reason “has made” (from the Latin: fac-
tum, facere); it is the necessary effect of reason itself. The moral law is there, 
beyond dispute, everyone with reason has access to it, because it is reason’s 
own produce, and it unconditionally demands universalizable moral actions. 
Schelling’s version of the Faktum der Vernunft would be another: It would em-
phasize reason itself as something that “has been made”. The Factum of reason 
is that reason has a history that has made it possible and is still “within it”, as 
its ground or essence. Indeed, “the unfathomable, prehistoric age rests in this 
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essence” (Schelling 1997: 114), and even if we don’t know of it or don’t want to 
know of it, it “slumbers within” and contains a “presentiment of and longing for 
knowledge […] in that unknowing itself.” (Ibid.: 115).
The historicity of reason is to Schelling not a hermeneutic question of narrativ-
ity, where the meanings of words gradually change and must be interpreted in 
due respect of the context of their enunciation, (this would probably count as 
something like a trivial fact to Schelling, at the most), but much more a question 
of reason as such as something that has a history, in the sense of having come 
into being at a certain point, and still containing this historicity as a fundamen-
tal part of its structure.
Reason thus contains a kind of longing for the unveiling of that which was be-
fore itself. Epistemologically speaking, this prehistory of reason cannot be rec-
ognized (erkannt), but it is nonetheless somehow known (gewusst), using the 
definitions from the opening lines of Weltalter:
The past is known, the present is recognized, the future is divined (Ibid.: 113).
Maybe one could thus translate Kant’s prohibition as a prohibition against 
claiming that something could be recognized about the thing-in-itself with the 
same means as those, we have at our disposal to recognize things from the “pre-
sent”, meaning that which can be a possible object of experience. According to 
Schelling, it is true that we cannot erkennen, what is the historically grounded 
otherness within us, but we nonetheless somehow know it. We have a knowl-
edge of the otherness that we cannot recognize. This knowledge is a Mit-Wissen-
schaft (Ibid.: 114): a knowledge with something else or along something else or 
taking part in something else. Human being has a co-science of that in (human) 
itself, which is not itself, and it thereby has access to a structure of grounding 
that is a necessary dimension of everything that-is. It is in a way always already 
known, since the Mit-Wissenschaft co-constitutes the very way, we are and think 
as humans, but there are nonetheless different ways of (not) dealing with this 
knowledge. The Kantian way would be a form of disavowal, while Schelling’s 
approach would be an attempt at acknowledging otherness as the only way of 
handling it and making it a potential creative force. Without dealing with this 
otherness, nothing ever really changes, and we continue to be led by the same, 
familiar structures that we pretend to have constructed by ourselves, as if out 
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of nowhere. (If the complaint against Weltalter is that it is “anthropocentric”, 
Schelling might therefore reply that it is on the contrary Kant, who is “xeno-pho-
bic”). The “ontological isomorphism” thus regards a logic of everything there 
is, such that it stands in a relation to its own ground in a way that human has a 
Mit-wissenschaft about:
Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is eternal of the soul has a 
co-science/con-sciousness [Mitt-Wissenschaft] of creation (Ibid.: 114)2.
The Mit-Wissenschaft is a co-knowledge of creation in the sense of the coming-
into-being of something, where “something” means both anything in general 
and anything at all. (In Heideggerian: The human being has a pre-ontological 
sense of the question of why there is anything at all). The structure must funda-
mentally be “akin in all things”: 
Even the smallest grain of sand must contain determinations within itself that we 
cannot exhaust until we have laid out the entire course of creative nature leading 
up to it (Ibid.: 121–122).
Everything that is has a history, in other words, and this goes even for the “pri-
mordial essence itself”: even for it, “something had to be posited as a past be-
fore the present time became possible” (Ibid.: 122). For everything that is, in as 
far as it is a present, it must have (had) a past, and so even for God to be, he 
too must have (had) a past. The solution to the problem of that in us, which is 
not ourselves, is therefore not simply that it is God. This is otherwise a familiar 
figure. Take Kierkegaard’s definition of the human being in The Sickness Unto 
Death, for example: Here, the self is defined as that which relates itself to itself 
and in relating itself to itself relates to an other, or to “something else” (Kierkeg-
aard 1989: 10). The self is “a derived self,” since it has not established itself, and 
that which has established it, at least in Anti-Climacus’ description, is unmis-
takably God (Ibid.: 13). Relating to one self means acknowledging an otherness 
in oneself, which is the conditioning force that is not oneself, and this force 
is God. God himself, however, is not having the same problem. The radicality 
of Schelling’s isomorphism is that not only is there something in us, which is 
2 “Co-science/con-sciousness” is Norman’s translation of Mitwissenschaft. I think especial-
ly the latter of the two is rather dubious, precisely because the knowledge of the past is not 
conscious in the sense of recognition.
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not ourselves, but there is something in God himself, which is not God himself. 
In Schelling, much more explicitly than in Kierkegaard, who is otherwise the 
thinker of the Paradox, there is really no Other of the Other.
… people have appealed long enough to the idea that God is the ground of his 
own existence. Is this notion of “ground” just an empty word, or does it denote 
something real? If it is just a word, then let us be more accurate and not allow 
ourselves to use senseless words. [On the other hand, if the ground is something 
real,] then people must themselves acknowledge that there was something before 
the existing God as such that did not itself exist because it is only the ground of 
existence (Schelling 1997: 149).
God himself has a past, and it is this past that in a few more steps will bring us to 
the subject of nothingness. There is, namely, another way of saying how Schell-
ing respects the impossibility of speaking of the thing in itself. If God has a past, 
this past is inexpressible. The coming to be of God himself must have relied on 
some repressed origin, which cannot be grasped (recognized) in the language of 
the present: “We can therefore see that in the very moment when the Highest is 
supposed to express itself, it becomes the inexpressible” (Ibid.: 170). To Schelling, 
the question of ancestrality, which is much debated these days, could maybe be 
termed as one of the ground that the human being (and like it all isomorphically 
similar beings, like God) carries with it or within it, but the ground itself cannot 
be put into words on the same conditions as what-is (das Seyende). The analytical 
language of “propositional content” therefore entirely fails to handle the ques-
tion of the ground in Schelling’s vision. His critique of the “form” of philosophy 
in his time is of course directed at Kantian philosophy, but reminds strikingly 
of the even more rigid form of contemporary Anglo-Saxon linguistic philosophy: 
Why was it, or has it been, impossible until now that philosophy – which is his-
tory with respect to its name and content – be history with respect to its form as 
well? (Ibid.: 114).
The form of a philosophy that takes its relation to history in the Schellingian 
sense seriously must in some way transmute into forms of evoking, indicating 
or isomorphically exemplifying that which has become inexpressible through 
its expression of the expressible. There is, in other words, a difference between 
how to express that, which can be stated in the language of the present, and that, 
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which cannot. In order to approach the question of the past, philosophy must 
reconsider the relation between that which can be said (in the language of the 
present) and the preconditions of its being said. Weltalter has its own theory of 
enunciation, which is in fact, I believe, not that different from a more contempo-
rary structuralist one: The expressing (das Aussprechende) is that which express-
es, but has itself thereby become inexpressible (the position of enunciation); 
the expressible (das Aussprechliche) is that which can be expressed; and the ex-
pressed (das Ausgesprochene) is that which has been expressed (the enunciated). 
What has been expressed is, for instance, what we are, but the expressing of our 
way of being expressed cannot itself be expressed. Or even more pointedly: The 
expressing (das Aussprechende) is posited as the expressing only through expres-
sion. Thereby, the only approach we have to the expressing (the position of enun-
ciation) is as that which has been made (our) past through expression. 
As Žižek has shown, this model fits quite nicely with the Lacanian conception 
of the structure of enunciation in its most basic form: “… the speaking agency 
is the Spirit qua $, the substanceless void of non-Nature, the distance of Nature 
toward itself” (Žižek 1997: 44). The “speaking agency” here refers to Schelling’s 
“das Aussprechende”, the expressing, which must be posited as the barred sub-
ject of the enunciation, in order for there to be enunciated: “… when I contract 
myself outside myself, I deprive myself of my substantial content” (Ibid.: 39). 
The expressing of myself as a human being with such and such qualities, abili-
ties, values and interests, happens by way of an expressing that posits a subject, 
which is then represented by a signifier (for another signifier). But the subject 
itself is the pure enunciation and not a thing that-is (ein Seiendes). The price for 
becoming a subject is to be alienated in language.
Similarly with God: The “Highest” is bigger than God or it is before God, in the 
sense that it is God in his expressing of himself. If God is his own ground, as it 
was claimed, then it means that he, “the really existing God” (as in “really exist-
ing socialism”), is the expression of something that he is not (anymore): “Wis-
dom was by the Lord. But who is the Lord? Indisputably, he is that will which 
rests within being [Seyn, HJB] and what-is [Seyende, HJB], the will through which 
alone being can actually be being and what-is can actually be what-is: the will 
that previously willed nothing” (Schelling 1997: 166). Being and what-is, in their 
pure form, are the expressible (das Aussprechliche), and in their expression the 
expressing becomes their past.
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God himself, the really existing, is only the expressed of that which he previ-
ously was. There is something in him, therefore, which is bigger and higher than 
himself, namely the will that willed nothing: The “immovable will that wills 
nothing is the Highest” (Ibid.: 134), and “this very will is above God” (Ibid.: 135). 
Maybe we could call this the ultimate prototype of the position of enunciation: 
the no-longer-actual and inexpressible will that wills nothing. This will does 
“rest within him”, but as that which previously willed nothing. It has expressed, 
and therefore has been moved out of its pure state of absolute indifference, but 
it remains within that which has been expressed as its history. 
The absolute indifference is “das schlechthin Erste”. It is the past of the world, 
where there is no subject and object, no grammar and no enunciated content 
of anything. Schelling’s myth of creation now says that everything that is (ex-
pressed) came into existence initially because of the transition from the will that 
wills nothing to a will that unconsciously wanted to remain in this state of bliss-
ful indifference. In other words, the will that wills nothing becomes the will that 
wills nothingness itself as such. This is what he calls contraction: “If we could 
say that the resting will is the First, then we can also say that an unconscious, 
tranquil, self-seeking will is the Second” (Ibid.: 137). This unconscious longing 
produces itself in eternity, in other words there is an almost unnoticeable slide 
from the will that wills nothing to willing nothingness as such. It is a minimal 
difference, but of immense consequences. If there is something in Schelling that 
could be called “less than nothing”, it must be this: the will that wills nothing 
contracts into something less than itself and thus creates the necessity of an 
outwards expansion3. Schelling’s illustration of this passage was quoted in the 
introduction, but it is worth repeating in this context. Imagine for instance lying 
on a green lawn on a beautiful summer’s day, with no care or concern:
[T]ry to remember how, in just such moments, a will is already at work producing 
itself, although unbeknownst to you and without your effort – indeed, you could 
not prevent this production. This will soon pulls you back to yourself; it tears you 
away, back into the activities of life. Remember this, and you will have an ap-
proximate picture of what we are presently undertaking to describe.
3 American comedian Louis C.K. has provided another version of less than nothing: When 
he discovered that his bank account was in minus, he realized that he couldn't even afford 
things that are for free. Maybe taking away something from someone who has nothing is 
the first moment of a revolution.
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Wanting to stay in the condition of blissful indifference effectively is a negation 
of this condition. It is like when two people are lying together in perfect har-
mony, and one of them says: “Isn’t this just wonderful?” At that precise moment, 
the harmony is ruined, and you might as well get up and get started. The next 
step is therefore also already inscribed into the first: “One and the same will 
is activated as the will that wills nothing and is also activated as the will that 
wills something (life and actuality)” (Ibid.: 177). The secret longing for itself that 
was the unconscious negation of the will that willed nothing thus turns into a 
will that wants itself as something. It first contracts and then expands – in one 
moment. This is what Schelling calls the “highest contradiction” (Ibid.: 169): 
“… one and the same will = x is two wills: one determinately negating and the 
other affirming” (Ibid.) Without this highest contradiction, there is no creation 
and no freedom, for it is only through it that the possibility exists to effectively 
change a situation and make one’s condition different. To Schelling, this means 
to create oneself a past. The principles of contraction and expansion together 
form the precondition of becoming something else than one was. 
The man who cannot separate himself from himself, who cannot break loose from 
everything that happens to him and actively oppose it – such a man has no past, 
or more likely he never emerges from it, but lives in it continually (Ibid.: 120).
Real deeds “which make a man genuinely himself” (Ibid.: 181) are moments of 
both contraction and expansion. Without this double negation (the negation of 
indifference and the negation of the contraction into its opposite) nothing ever 
begins – and this goes even for decisions in human life: a real decision does 
not consist in weighing the arguments for and against, but in the moment of 
rupture of what ultimately counts as for and against. The first moment is the 
contraction (“all life begins with contraction” (Ibid.: 179)), and the second is 
expansion (“a positively negating will… that does not will nothing but rather 
wills something” (Ibid.: 169)) but the two can only be analytically discerned, 
they are not separate engulfed events that proceed one after another: “… did 
you honestly take factors into consideration, engage in deliberation and reach 
a decision, when you grasped yourself for the first time and expressed yourself 
as who you are?” (Ibid.: 175). 
Creation is the moment where the will that wills nothing is made into the past 
of that which is expressed. The two contradictory forces of contraction and ex-
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pansion must, however, somehow be kept in balance, if creation is not going 
to propel directly and immediately into its own destruction. Take cancer as an 
example: here, the principle of expansion that is behind all life and activity (in 
biological life as the production and division of cells) runs amok and starts pro-
ducing cells beyond any viable measure and purpose and soon threatens to ter-
minate life as such, if it is not kept in check. Or take revolution: If it doesn’t find 
a new modus vivendi after overthrowing power, it will degenerate into chaos (ex-
pansion) or maybe create some paranoid normalcy which more and more closes 
in on itself and “eats its own children” (contraction). The two forces must bal-
ance each other, and the name of this balance is spirit: “… when two conflicting 
wills are present – one affirming and one negating – spirit is already called for 
as well” (Ibid.: 169). Wolfram Hogrebe has illustrated this balance as the right 
speed of a film reel in a movie theatre: If the reel goes too fast, we just see a blur 
of colours; if it goes too slow, we see only isolated images without any sensible 
connection (Hogrebe 1989: 100).
The externalization or expression of the will that wills nothing thus leads to 
a contractive-expansion, which must again be balanced by spirit. It is almost 
as if creation is God’s losing control of himself, and the history of the world as 
spirit is his cleaning up after the mess that he had produced. Spirit is thus the 
real, unifying force that relates the expressed to the expressing; it takes part in 
eternity by engendering the kinds of balance that keep the different and differ-
entiating forces in check:
This entire life, after all, originated in the first place out of the longing of eternity 
for itself. In searching for itself and yet not being able to find itself, the will pro-
duced itself in an urgent manner, desiring eternity and seeking contact with it. 
Through progressive increase, this will has now constructed a series of steps by 
which it can ascend to eternity. For spirit – or the highest unity produced through 
its desire – is by nature one with indifference or eternity. For this reason spirit is not 
only the unity of the opposites, as was assumed until now; it is at the same time the 
link between eternity and the life built up from below, a life that already presents 
itself ever more clearly as the instrument of eternity (Schelling 1997: 146-147).
The will that wills nothing is our past, but in a spiritual effort we nonetheless 
partake in it, when we succeed in balancing the contradictory forces of nature 
in a way that allows a kind of tranquil contemplation. In times of unrest and 
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threats, spirit could be the serene overview that allows one to remain calm and 
make the right decisions. “To be as if one were not, to have as if one had not; 
that is in man, that is in God, the Highest of all” (Ibid.: 133). 
To Schelling, there is an ascension in the spiritual development of the world, 
which mirrors the eternal being, by restoring the kind of “blissful balance”, if 
you will, which could not be maintained in creation: “Now that the spirit of na-
ture wants to be the link between eternity and nature, it strives to express actu-
ally in matter – as material that is subordinated to it – what is contained only as 
possibility in eternal being” (Ibid.: 154). Another way of saying this could be that 
spirit is coming to itself through the gradual sublation of the relation between 
ground and existence. (And to push the point: In an eschatological reading of 
the entire project of the Weltalter, the future could be seen as the sublation of 
the world as such; spirit as the premonition of this sublation).
A mind of winter
Before I close with some remarks on the issuing concepts of nothing, I would 
like to preempt some of the main points via Wallace Stevens’ 1923 poem “The 
Snow Man” (Stevens 2001) – which has also provided the title of this paper. Ste-
vens here, is my suggestion, could be seen as Schelling’s allied in the cause of 
ontological isomorphism, and he gives a rather refined approach to the concept 
of nothingness which will allow us to distinguish between two overall concep-
tions of nothingness in Weltalter.
The Snow Man
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter  
Of the January sun;
and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves,  
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Which is the sound of the land 
Full of the same wind 
That is blowing in the same bare place  
For the listener,
who listens in the snow, 
And,
nothing himself, beholds 
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.
One must have a mind of winter and have been cold a long time in order to really 
grasp the junipers shagged with ice; and it is an effort not to think of any misery 
in the sound of the cold wind that is blowing in the same bare place. One must 
in a way tune in on the isomorph structures of other forms of being (Seyendes), 
in order to do them justice and contemplate their participance in creation. The 
listener is himself nothing – he is not a humanistic self-relying, non-alienated 
subject, and (in virtue of that) he beholds nothing that is not there, which could 
mean that he does not make up fictions of angels or unicorns in order to de-
scribe what-is or to generate some emotional response to the icy wind in the 
same bare place. In order, precisely, to avoid anthropomorphism, one must be 
strictly precise and describe nothing that is not there.
But maybe the “nothing that is not there” could also strike the chord of the prob-
lem of the ultimate status of the will that wills nothing. If this will is the past 
of creation, a state of blissful indifference that nonetheless contains the pro-
pensity towards an unconscious longing for itself that turns into contraction-
expansion, it is in fact, I believe, difficult not to see it as what Žižek has called 
“a positively charged void” – the “schlechthin erste” that contains being and 
what-is as the expressible, but is now, within the history of the world, itself not 
there (anymore). The spiritual effort of the beholder, in this reading, makes this 
void nonetheless “there to behold”, as something “known” [gewusst], rather 
than something recognized [erkannt]. The word “behold” could be rendered in 
this way also – it derives from the Old English behealdan, that can also mean 
“to hold, have, occupy, possess, guard”, etc. (and not just “to see”). Spirit is the 
beholding, guarding of the void of the past. This interpretation threatens to take 
Schelling in the direction of a mysticist and conservative version of the void – 
but it is one, which I think one must admit that there are ample justifications of 
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in the Weltalter. Behold the nothing which is not there: Be aware of the past that 
resides in every present being.
A second version of the “nothing which is not there” would, however, appear 
from asking Schelling a question, which would take the interpretation in an-
other direction: What if spirit is all there is, or what if the nothing, which is not 
there, is not a prehistoric condition, but a retroactive positing of the beginning? 
This version would insist on the purely formal aspect of the relation between the 
expressing and the expressed. The expressing would be nothing but the empty 
point of enunciation (a nothing which is not there), seen from the perspective of 
spirit that contemplates the contractive and expansive forces of nature in itself 
and in everything else that exists. The “schlecthin erste” would in this sense 
only be there retroactively, and spirit would be alone, without a positive void to 
refer to in its endeavor to balance the forces of the world. On the bright side, the 
will that wills nothing would then be spirit’s own accomplishment – it would 
not “partake” in something higher, when contemplating the world, but simply 
represent an unfolding of history as such. This interpretation would risk taking 
Schelling too much in the direction of Hegel, and Schelling might reproach it 
with the words from early on in the Weltalter: “All science must pass through 
dialectic. But is there never a point at which it becomes free and alive, as when a 
historian, representing an image of past times, no longer thinks of his investiga-
tions?” (Schelling 1997: 118).
Finally, neither of these two interpretations excludes the thinking of contradic-
tion as real and as pertaining to everything there is. Everything carries its own 
past within it, and everything there is, is the result of a beginning, as well as a 
kind of balanced equilibrium, that remains an expression of both contraction 
and expansion. “The highest contradiction” concerned the two wills that are 
both opposites and the same: the negating will and the affirming. These two re-
main, regardless of the interpretation of the status of the will that wills nothing, 
and they resonate in the principles of being (Seyn) and what-is (Seyende) that 
are also, like contraction and expansion, described as two contrary principles 
that one and the same thing might be at the same time.
So, one last round with the snowman: He beholds, besides the nothing that is 
not there, the nothing which is there, which might be interpreted along the lines 
of Schelling’s description of the what-is-not (das Nichtseyende), which is “un-
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graspable only insofar as and to the extent that it is not; to the extent that, as 
what-is-not, it nonetheless is, to that extent it is indeed graspable and compre-
hensible” (Ibid.: 142-3). The what-is-not is certainly not “the nothing” pure and 
simple (das Nichts), Schelling emphasizes (Ibid.: 141), but rather, in fact, Being 
(Seyn). Being is what-is-not, but nonetheless something that can be beholden in 
relation to what-is. It is as the negative “only latent in what-is, while what-is, or 
the positive principle, is revealed and active” (Ibid.: 142). I risk this interpreta-
tion: What-is-not can be grasped and comprehended to the extent that it is the 
what-is-not of something what-is. Take for instance a lecture room with chairs 
and boards and various types of equipment: The what-is-not for it is that which 
allows it to be what-is. The room is not filled with water or one massive bloc of 
impenetrable being. In its condition of being what-is, it is granted its being by 
what-is-not. A table, for example, is something that is, only to the extent that it 
is being granted by that which is not, otherwise in wouldn’t have any limits or 
shape. Being grants that-which-is its existence by withholding itself. And this 
what-is-not (das Nichtseyende of the table, which allows it to be a table) can be 
called the nothing which is there. This is graspable, although you only see it as 
that which is not in relation to a what-is.
Back to the ground
So, what is the ground of existence – and in which way(s) does it regard the 
void? I think Weltalter offers at least a couple of different interpretations of this, 
which might be summarized as in the following, on the face of it going in each 
their own direction.
The ground is being. A book, like any other object, contains two principles that 
are somehow held in check; the Seyende, the what-is, as its positive, confirming 
moment, and Seyn, the what-is-not, as its negative, contrary moment. One might 
emphasize simply the what-is-not as the ground of that which-is; the necessary 
flipside of things that are, which is nothing “in itself”, but can nonetheless be 
beholden as the what-is-not of what-is. The nothing that is is the ground, mean-
ing the what-is-not as the precondition of that which is. (Against this interpreta-
tion speaks the understanding of the expansive force, in for instance cancer, as 
itself part of the ground).
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The ground is the contradiction of contraction and expansion latent in a spiritual 
balance of what we perceive as objects. One might instead see both of these con-
tradictory forces, contractive and expansive, as the ground and the book itself 
as a kind of spiritual miracle that keeps these two forces in check. The existing 
things, objects, like a book, would thus be said to contain within them two con-
tradictory principles as their ground, and both of them could potentially “run 
amok”, either annihilating the existing thing in a contractive movement or ex-
ploding it in an expansive movement. (Against this interpretation speaks the 
questionable status of that which is: If that which we call a book is not the posi-
tive, expansive principle kept in check by its contractive counterweight, then 
what is it? Is it a Kantian Erscheinung with two inherent, contradictory princi-
ples that apply to it only when considered as a thing-in-itself?).
The ground is the will that wills nothing as the past of that which has been ex-
pressed, i.e. even of the contradictory forces of contraction and expansion them-
selves. Finally, one might emphasize the will that wills nothing as still resting 
within both being and what-is as part of the ground or maybe even the ground 
of the ground, or the Ungrund, as it is later called. God as his own ground would 
mean that the past of God is his ground; that which is prior to both contraction 
and expansion is the ground even of these.
In the first version, the ground is, so to say, merely the flip side of existing things. 
In the second, it is a more fundamental characteristic of things that are – they 
contain some contradictory forces “underneath” the surface, which sometimes 
burst out. And in the third, there is a pre-historic grounding of everything, pure 
and simple, including any forces inherent in actually existing things.
Without claiming to be able to resolve this tension, I think it is at least possible 
to read these three options as more closely related than presented above, and 
thereby hopefully tie some of the discussions in this article a bit together.
Everything that is, is and is not. A book relies on both its expansive and contrac-
tive dimension in order to appear, and sustain itself, as a book. It is both. In 
other words, the two dimensions co-exist in things. Their contradictory nature 
means that they simultaneously apply to the same thing, through which they 
are being expressed. Even though the what-is of a thing can thus be described as 
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its “positive”, expansive side, it is nonetheless the what-is of a thing that is thus 
described, and similarly with its “negative” side.
It is clearly impossible for what-is, as such, ever to be being, as such, and vice 
versa; it is also impossible for opposites as such to be one. We do not need to 
insist on these points, since to claim the opposite would be to do away with 
common sense, with the possibility of expressing oneself, and indeed, with the 
contradiction itself. Yet it is surely possible that one and the same thing be both 
what-is and being, affirming and negating, light and darkness, good and evil. 
(Ibid.: 130).
The book, furthermore, relies on its own emergence as a book in the combined 
expression of the contraction-expansion that was its creation. In other words, it 
has a past. In its absolute sense, this past evades description. It must be posited 
as the mere expressing of everything that is, or it must be thought as the will 
that previously willed nothing. If spirit partakes in this will (or if there is only 
spirit, and the will that wills nothing is a retroactive presupposition of spirit) 
then we may conclude that there are two forms of nothing in Schelling’s Wel-
talter: a nothing that is and a nothing that isn’t. The first is the contractive force 
of everything that is, in its grounding relation to a counterforce of expansion, 
both of which are not beings, but the fundamental, contradictory forces of all 
beings (and could probably be compared to the void and the atom), and the sec-
ond is the original precondition of the spiritual force that upholds this balance, 
in as far as it is sustained; itself related to a nothing that is not there, but which 
nonetheless exerts its effect.
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